International law specialists have explored the blockade's legal propriety and how far legal considerations influenced U.S. and Soviet behavior during the missile crisis. 6 However, historians have tended to overlook the legal side of the confrontation, perhaps out of a reluctance to engage with the perceived complexities of international law and because of the influential realist conception that international law carries little if any weight when vital national interests are at stake. 7 This article explores the U.S. government's making and presentation of the legal case for the blockade and discusses how the British, Canadian, and Australian governments responded. 8 The article is based on declassified documents-some rarely used before-from U.S. and British archives, alongside the analyses of jurists and historians. The work provides a fresh angle on the legality of the blockade and on how the U.S. administration tried to "sell" its policy during the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War. Vol. 57, No. 3 (1963) , pp. 546-565, who argued that the U.S. government fell short of its "legal obligations to respect the freedom of the seas, to submit threats to the peace to the United Nations before taking unilateral action, and to refrain from use or threat of force in international relations except in individual or collective self-defense against armed attack, under authority of the United Nations" (p. 563). 
Legal Thinking about Naval Blockades
The law of naval blockades has long been an aspect of customary international law, which reflects legal customs or habits and imposes obligations on governments. First used in the sixteenth century, the blockade was a form of siege warfare that involved isolating enemy ports or coastline from the high seas to prevent seaborne commerce with other countries. A blockade was seen as a definitive act of war, but in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "pacific" (non-belligerent) blockades emerged as a supposedly legal means of coercion short of war. These were "pacific" because they were confined only to the vessels of the blockaded country and because they were associated with relatively minor disputes such as the non-payment of debts. However, the doctrine of pacific blockade was controversial. Jurist Lassa Oppenheim noted in 1952 that scholars disagreed about the legality of blockades confined only to the vessels of the blockaded states but were all in agreement that the peacetime seizure and sequestration of the vessels of third-party states was illegal.
9 International law embodies law-making treaties as well as customary law. These treaties include the United Nations (UN) Charter of 1945, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Law of the Sea (1948), the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities (1961), and many others. Article 2 of the UN Charter states that "all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means" and should "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force." Furthermore, Article 42 appears to prohibit the unilateral institution of a blockade by providing for Security Council authorization of operations "by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." 10 The international legal scholar Ian Brownlie suggested in 1963 that the UN Charter helped to normalize "the illegality of force as a means of self-help," other than in self-defense.
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Since 1960, the U.S. government had tried to depose the regime of Fidel Castro in Havana through a variety of measures, including the supposedly covert orchestration of what turned out to be a disastrous attack on Cuba by émigrés at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Delegates at the UN and jurists criticized the action as violating the general principles of international law requiring a state to prevent military expeditions against other states from its territory in peacetime and as contravening various inter-American conventions opposing interventions. 12 In the late summer of 1962-against the background of Castro's consolidation of power and a Soviet military buildup in Cubasome members of Congress advocated a naval blockade (of unspecified scope) against the island. However, Chayes, head of the State Department's Legal Office, questioned the lawfulness of this option. In his assessment, a belligerent blockade, involving the legal right to interfere with third-party commerce, was problematic "because we are not in a state of war with Cuba." 13 At the same time, a pacific blockade would have to be "proportionate to a specific international wrong" committed by the Havana regime and would need to be "reconciled with obligations undertaken in the Inter-American system and under the UN Charter."
14
In respect of the inter-American obligations, Chayes argued that with a two-thirds vote the OAS could be enlisted to back the blockade of Cuba and that in those circumstances a blockade could be regarded as a UN "enforcement action" under UN Charter Article 53, which enabled the UN Security Council to "utilize . . . regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority." 15 He noted, however, that in practice this would be impossible because the Soviet Union would veto such a resolution in the Security Council. Chayes also suggested it might be possible to avoid the "belligerent blockade" designation by stretching the definition of a pacific blockade "to cover shipping of nations aligned with the blockaded one," although he conceded that the "legal and political problems" would be formidable. 16 These reflections seemed mostly hypothetical prior to the discovery of the Soviet nuclear missiles, and Chayes later put his reservations aside to become a vigorous advocate of the legality of the "quarantine"-although the case rested in part on the presence of the weapons.
Around this time, a further analysis was prepared for Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy based on (as yet unverified) speculation in Congress that the Soviet Union had turned Cuba into a nuclear missile base. 17 Norbert Schlei of the Department of Justice concluded that "international law would permit use by the United States of relatively extreme measures, including various forms and degrees of force, for the purpose of terminating such a threat to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere."
18 Therefore, the justification in Schlei's argument was one of self-defense. Even though the U.S. government did not ultimately invoke self-defense in its legal case, that justification for the blockade did feature heavily in the narrative of U.S. policy. Likewise, Chayes's idea of using the OAS as a UN substitute became a pillar of the legal case-minus his reservations. The analyses from Chayes and Schlei meant that the legal dimension of the blockade had been explored by the time the Soviet missiles were discovered, which ensured that an off-the-peg legal case was available for the crisis-subject to minor alteration to ensure the best fit.
The Legal Case for the "Quarantine" of Cuba
On 16 October, the day after the missiles were discovered, the ad-hoc Executive Committee (ExComm) of the U.S. National Security Council met for the first time to discuss whether to attack the missile bases or to blockade Cuba as a means of inhibiting the development of the bases and pressuring the Soviet Union into withdrawing the missiles. 19 When the ExComm members focused on a blockade, they considered whether war should be declared 17 22 President Kennedy also opposed declaring war. Although he was keen to convey a stance of firm resolve and was reluctant to make public concessions, he recognized the potential for a trade involving U.S. "Jupiter" missiles stationed in Turkey, and he felt that declaring war would reduce his options by generating pressure to attack the Soviet missile bases. 23 As a result, the United States refrained from declaring war against Cuba.
U.S. officials chose the term "quarantine" instead of "blockade" or Norbert Schlei's suggestion of "visit and search blockade." 24 The inspiration for the choice of word has been attributed to President Kennedy (by Norbert Schlei), to Leonard Meeker (by Chayes and by Meeker himself ), to Dean Acheson (by Paul Nitze), and to others, including Richard Nixon, who had used the term earlier. 25 Regardless of who first proposed the term, the purpose of using it, as Meeker explained, was "to avoid any implication of a state of war from the imposition of measures which we described as blockade." 26 The term was an attempt to convey restraint in a volatile situation as well as to obviate legal difficulties. In addition, it had the benefit of echoing a 1937 speech in which President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged "peace-loving nations" to "quarantine" the European "aggressors," and it avoided unfavorable associations with the Soviet blockade of Berlin in [1948] [1949] . 27 The Department of State maintained that the "quarantine" was "a selective effort designed to deal with a threat to peace" by "preventing the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba in order to protect ourselves and this hemisphere from war." By contrast, a blockade was "an operational part of the conduct of war, designed to force a state to comply with the wishes of the blockading country by crushing the economy of the state."
28 Therefore, according to the American government, the "quarantine" was an instrument of peace, not war.
Radhika Withana has argued that the U.S. government's legal advocacy was an attempt to change international law, whereas the historian Jutta Weldes sees the reference to a "quarantine" rather than "blockade" as an attempt to camouflage "an act of aggression against a sovereign state."
29 Similarly, the historian Robert Weisbrot sees the word "quarantine" as "a velvet wrap to cushion global reaction to a U.S. show of seapower."
30 Some within the U.S. government were critical at the time. Richard N. Gardner of the U.S. mission to the UN suggested privately that "a blockade cannot be justified by its selectivity or by using some other name."
31 However, the focus on terminology from Meeker and others and the accompanying elaboration of the legal position were efforts both to develop international law and to shape moral perceptions of U.S. policy. Each objective involved trying to bring about a positive view of the blockade. In the legal context, this was not straightforward. The position that only military equipment rather than the necessities of life would be designated contraband, and that vessels carrying military cargo would be diverted rather than seized or destroyed, represented the more pacific aspects of the blockade. 32 At the same time, blockading third-party vessels presented a belligerent aspect that was hard to square with existing international law. The lack of UN backing was a further awkward question.
U.S. officials recognized from the start that the Soviet Union and Cuba would condemn the U.S. legal position. A Soviet legal specialist had argued in Pravda in September 1962 that blockading Cuba would represent the "same sort of international crime as an armed invasion," and during the missile crisis Khrushchev complained that the blockade violated "international norms of freedom of navigation on the high seas" and that the OAS authorization had no legal standing. 33 Castro likewise declared that the blockade contravened "international law and Cuban sovereignty" and was an attack on "the rights of all countries because it was proposed to violate ships of all nationalities on the high seas."
34 Both Khrushchev and Castro were selective in their respect for international law (given Soviet actions in Hungary in 1956 and Cuban subversion in Latin America, for example). A recent analysis has noted that the Soviet Union did not ultimately present a full legal case, but some U.S. officials worried that Soviet and Cuban legal arguments could gain momentum. 35 Although it emerged on Wednesday, 24 October, that Soviet ships carrying military cargo en route to Cuba were retreating, the fact that the blockade was to last until all "offensive" weapons had been removed caused Chayes's assistant, Meeker, to spend time at the UN in New York so that he could "turn aside and defeat" Soviet arguments by outlining the "legal grounds . . . for taking measures of force to remove the missile bases." 36 Why did the U.S. government not take its case to the UN as soon as the missiles were discovered, rather than moving ahead independently with a naval blockade? Four major considerations militated against such a step. First, U.S. officials suspected that awkward questions would be raised about the comparability of the Soviet bases in Cuba and U.S. nuclear missile bases abroad-especially in Turkey. Second, the UN was not likely to greet news of the bases with alarm, and even if a majority of member-states accepted that the missile deployments were an act of aggression, the organization could not authorize the use of force because of the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council. Third, pursuing the issue in the UN would be time-consuming. Finally, because President Kennedy had warned the Soviet Union in September about the danger of stationing "offensive" weapons in Cuba, it would be difficult to compromise on the issue. 37 Meeker, in assessing the politics of the UN Security Council, anticipated that at least three non-permanent members-Romania, the United Arab Republic and Ghana-would oppose the blockade. The seven votes required to authorize the blockade would be available only if all the other states other than the USSR-permanent members Britain, France, and the Republic of China, and non-permanent members Chile, Venezuela, and Ireland-voted affirmatively. However, the Irish position was unclear, and even if the United States could muster enough votes to endorse U.S. policy, the Soviet Union would use its veto to prevent matters from going further. 38 The U.S. delegation in New York proposed a Security Council resolution under Article 40, which enabled the body to moderate a dispute by "call[ing] upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable."
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The proposed resolution required the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all "offensive" weapons in Cuba, under UN supervision. The initiative was purely symbolic, and Chayes was well aware that it "stood no chance of being adopted and was not introduced with an expectation that it would be." 40 Another possibility was a UN General Assembly authorization of the blockade using the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, which the United States and Canada had sponsored in 1950 to circumvent the paralysis of the Security Council. 41 This resulted in UN condemnation of the People's Republic of China as the aggressor in Korea, but the increased number of General Assembly members in subsequent years (a result of decolonization in Africa and Asia) did not bring a corresponding boost in support for the United States.
The result was that, as a British analysis noted, U.S. officials doubted their ability during the missile crisis "to muster a sufficiently impressive majority" in the General Assembly. 42 Therefore the "Uniting for Peace" procedure remained dormant. Beyond the UN Security Council and General Assembly, Acting Secretary General U Thant strove to mediate. He proposed a suspension of the U.S. blockade and of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, during which the superpowers would negotiate. By 28 October, officials in Washington and Moscow had reached an agreement featuring a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba and an unofficial commitment to remove the Jupiter missiles in Turkey within six months, in return for the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. The subsequent negotiations in New York to work out the details of the arrangement took place under U Thant's good offices. He visited Cuba to try to establish a UN inspection regime to confirm the removal of the missiles, although Castro's concerns about national sovereignty aborted the effort. 43 The difficulty of working through the UN induced the Kennedy administration to look to the OAS to authorize the blockade of Cuba. On 23 October, Rusk persuaded the OAS's Organ of Consultation to provide post facto support. 44 The use of a regional organization putatively in service of the UN was a first. Because of the gambit's ambiguous legal status, Gardner feared it would "erode" the U.S. position. 45 Other governments also questioned the legitimacy of using the OAS instead of the UN.
The vigorous U.S. response to the discovery of Soviet nuclear missile bases in Cuba was consistent with the Monroe Doctrine, a warning from President James Monroe in 1823 to deter European states from encroaching into the Americas. Eighty years later, Theodore Roosevelt's "Corollary" adapted the doctrine to legitimize U.S. military intervention in Latin America. By the 1930s, after debate among U.S. and Latin American international lawyers, politicians, and intellectuals, the Monroe Doctrine had been reframed as what one historian describes as "a continental and multilateral principle of nonintervention." 46 This process of evolution meant that, as Rusk told the Senate in September 1962, the doctrine had changed "both by circumstances and by agreement," although it remained "an elementary part of our whole national security interests." 47 The State Department suggested that in establishing the blockade, the United States had "acted unilaterally in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine as well as multilaterally with its friends in the hemisphere to counter" the Soviet "threat in a manner consistent with international law and our treaty obligations." 48 However, U.S. officials did not mention the doctrine in the legal case because, in the words of one analysis, it "did not create a special legal regime for the Western Hemisphere in which the United States is entitled to depart from the ordinary rules."
49 Furthermore, the doctrine had long-term associations with unilateralism and heavy-handedness, despite a partial repudiation of the Roosevelt Corollary and the adoption of a more "neighborly" turn under Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s. Therefore, the U.S. argument was that the naval embargo or "quarantine" fell short of a belligerent blockade and that the OAS could properly be used as a regional agency of the UN even without Security Council authorization. 
Self-Defense?
The legal attempt to justify the blockade was silent about the right of selfdefense; that is, the right to respond with force to an actual or imminent armed attack. Chayes wrote later that presenting self-defense arguments would have suggested that the U.S. government took the view that "the situation was to be governed by national discretion not international law." 50 Nonetheless, self-defense did feature in the general narrative of U.S. policy. President Kennedy described the Soviet missiles in his 22 October public address as "offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction" that would generate a "full retaliatory response" should any be launched. 51 U.S. officials tended to think that Moscow's chief objective behind establishing the bases in Cuba was strategic, to remedy the inferior status of the Soviet Union in the nuclear balance of power. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, for example, speculated that Khrushchev's "generals have been telling him . . . that he was missing a golden opportunity to add to his strategic capability."
52 Although no comparable Soviet assessments are available, a U.S. intelligence analysis suggested that the missiles in Cuba were of great strategic significance because they "increase the first-strike missile salvo which the USSR could place on targets in the continental United States by over 40%." 53 This, however, did not mean that the Soviet Union intended to launch the missiles. For a start, the country was still in a position of nuclear inferiority, and, more broadly, as L. W. Fuller of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff noted, nuclear weapons meant "deterrence, for actual use means mutual destruction." 54 After the resolution of the missile crisis and the provision of a non-invasion pledge from the U.S. government, Soviet representatives argued that removal of the missiles from Cuba was reasonable because the Cuban revolution was now safe. 55 Western officials at the time tended to dismiss this argument as a post facto rationalization, but the emergence of new evidence since the end of the Cold War has brought greater acceptance of the "defending Cuba" argument. After reviewing Soviet sources, Sergey Radchenko concluded that "it is no longer safe to claim that Khrushchev was motivated strictly by strategic considerations." 56 Securing an ally in the Western Hemisphere was a tremendous political advance for Moscow and was to be guarded carefully.
Despite taking the legal initiative, U.S. officials never denied Cuba's right to accept the missiles, for there would have been no basis for making that argument. Cuba had consented to the placement of the missiles, and, as jurist Quincy Wright noted, a sovereign state is legally free to take, within its own territory and in the absence of treaty obligations to the contrary, measures that it considers necessary for its defense. 57 The Soviet Union raised the issue of Cuban sovereignty successfully in the UN Security Council on 24 October. Valentin Zorin, according to the British envoy to the UN, Patrick Dean, "contrived to bring home effectively" the point that "every country has a right to choose what weapons of defense should be stationed on its own sovereign soil."
58 This argument was a compelling one, as some U.S. officials acknowledged. Richard F. Pederson of the U.S. mission to the UN admitted that "from the point of view of international law missiles in Cuba and in Turkey were equally legal," and Fuller conceded that "the argument that Soviet missiles in Cuba are offensive while ours in Turkey are defensive is a plain, subjective rationalisation." 59 The United States had in recent years established nuclear missile bases in Britain, Italy, and Turkey. But U.S. officials insisted that these bases were different from the ones in Cuba because Soviet actions were secret and completely unwarranted, whereas the United States had acted openly in response to the adversary's "expansion and aggression." 60 From a legal standpoint, these arguments were far-fetched. By stationing nuclear missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev and Castro were responding at least in part to U.S. aggression, and the secrecy of the Soviet operation had no bearing on its legality. 61 For the Kennedy administration, though, secrecy did make the issue more inflammatory, given that in September the president had warned Moscow that grave consequence would ensue if Cuba was turned into a nuclear missile base. Political concerns were also very much evident in Kennedy's public address on 22 October, which condemned "the secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States . . . in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy." 62 The following day he privately referred to the Soviet missiles as a "horror" that would "embarrass me in the [November Congressional] election." 63 Peter Ling has maintained that Kennedy had to challenge the deployment in Cuba successfully to avoid being "damaged politically." Allies in Europe would "fret about irresolute American leadership. . . . Third World countries would perceive the USSR as a more assiduous protector of its allies, and Khrushchev himself would be emboldened to act forcefully elsewhere"-including, perhaps, in Berlin. Additionally, the president's "domestic Republican opponents" would stand a greater chance of electoral success. 64 William J. Medland has noted that designating the Soviet missiles in Cuba as offensive enabled the U.S. government to present an international political matter as a security threat. 65 To be sure, the response to the discovery of the missiles in Cuba could have reflected, without contradiction, worries about politics and prestige on the one hand and about physical security on the other, but politics and prestige are not pertinent to the law of self-defense. Furthermore, any attempt to convey the impression that the Soviet Union was poised to launch a nuclear first strike from Cuba was mere hyperbole, so the invocation of self-defense in U.S. rhetoric must be taken with a substantial pinch of salt.
Allied Responses to the Legal Case
Withana has argued that "Soviet representatives were unable through their legal rhetoric to establish the 'legality' of their position or the illegality of the U.S. position," but the foreign officials outside the Soviet bloc who expressed a view tended to doubt only the U.S. (not the Soviet) legal position. 66 This was evident in the attitudes of the closest U.S. ally, Great Britain.
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Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's initial reaction to news of the Soviet missiles was to favor military action. He wrote in his diary that the president ought "to seize Cuba and have done with it." 68 According to Peter Catterall, Macmillan's view derived from doubts about both the legality of the blockade and its ability to facilitate the removal of the nuclear missiles. 69 But after Washington had decided to blockade Cuba rather than attack the bases, Macmillan asked Kennedy for "the best legal case" so that British UN Representative Dean could "weigh in effectively" on behalf of the U.S. government at the UN. Macmillan noted that they had to address the point "that a blockade which involves the searching of ships of all countries is difficult to defend in peacetime." 70 Kennedy duly instructed his "experts" to "confer" with British experts "to provide the best possible legal case." 71 The legal status of the blockade mattered to London because British sympathy with U.S. policy had its limits. Labour Party leader Harold Wilson argued on television that the United States should have taken the case to the UN before imposing a blockade. 72 A national opinion poll in The Daily Mail on 25 October indicated that 36 percent of Britons opposed the blockade and 63 percent thought the U.S. action threatened world peace. 73 Letters to Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, who gave a televised, pro-U.S. speech to the International Chamber of Commerce in London on 23 October, are also revealing. Alongside urging British mediation, many of the correspondents raised legal objections to U.S. policies. Some, for example, urged the British government to "state unambiguously that Britain will refuse to have her legal maritime rights abused" by having to comply with the blockade. Others demanded that Kennedy "cancel his illegal blockade of a sovereign state in time of peace" and denounced the blockade as an example of "piracy on the High Seas . . . interfering with British ships going about lawful trade."
74 Some of the criticism came from those who no doubt were always hostile to U.S. actions, and in most cases the reflections appeared to derive from instinct rather than expertise. However, the hazy legal status of the blockade provided the amateur lawyers with ammunition.
Still, some officials in Whitehall expressed sympathy with the U.S. legal case. Lord Hailsham, the leader of the House of Lords (and a lawyer), noted that in an age when nuclear weapons were "ready to go off at a moment's 69. Ibid notice" there were questions about the relevance of classical law reflecting the technology of the "sailing ship and the cannon" and a clear distinction between war and peace. 75 Nonetheless, Lord Chancellor Dilhorne summarized the consensus of government lawyers as holding that "the 'quarantine' could not be justified as a 'pacific blockade'" given that it extended to third-party vessels without a declaration of war. Even if one accepted that the Soviet nuclear missile bases in Cuba posed "a threat to the United States of such imminence as to necessitate . . . immediate steps to render that threat nugatory," the U.S. action "appears to be designed to prevent the threat becoming imminent." 76 The British mission to the UN concluded that Washington relied excessively on the regional agency argument and that no adequate legal justification supported "the interception under the 'quarantine' measures of ships of third states on the high seas."
77 British officials in New York and Washington encouraged their U.S. counterparts to use "language indicating more precisely the nature of the measures which they are imposing" rather than the "undefined term 'quarantine.'" 78 They feared that the term would generate "criticism and ridicule." 79 U.S. officials, however, felt they had selected the best description of the naval embargo and therefore saw no reason to change.
Douglas-Home, for his part, believed that Cuba had been "entitled to call for military aid from another government if necessary for the purpose of its defense," just as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had consented to U.S. nuclear missile bases on their territory. 80 He also maintained that, "while it might be possible for the U.S. administration to justify action against Cuban ships and possibly Soviet ships," it was "in the absence of United Nations authority . . . very difficult to justify action" against the ships of other countries. 81 Freedom of the seas was a sensitive issue for a country with a proud naval heritage. Royal Navy frigates in the West Indies made a point of avoiding the blockade to allow the U.S. Navy to focus on Soviet vessels, but the fact that Britain had (over U.S. objections) maintained trade links with Cuba meant that British civilian ships might be affected. 82 Some British vessels in the Caribbean were not destined for Cuba, and others, having loaded in Communist ports, were bound for the island. 83 DouglasHome noted that if Washington extended the blockade to include petroleum, oil, lubricants, and other commodities, British shippers might have to "abandon the Cuba run altogether and take whatever action was open to them to secure legal redress." 84 Macmillan recognized that extending the blockade would mean "trouble" insofar as the British government would then face the awkward proposition of having to back the rights of its citizens against Washington. 85 The U.S. Navy was instructed to make only spot checks on friendly shipping, and ultimately no British vessels were detained. 86 However, the fact that the British government reserved its legal rights in relation to shipping shows that, as historian Christopher Hull has argued, it would stand by international law when national interests were threatened. More vital, though, was the need to support the United States. 87 Therefore, according to Len Scott, Macmillan "subordinated international law to the exigencies of the [missile] crisis." 88 The prime minister's pragmatism was evident in how he attempted to silence the legal critics. On 25 October, when a member of Parliament in the House of Commons mentioned "talk . . . about acts of piracy," Macmillan responded that this was not "the moment to go into the niceties of international law . . . in new . . . unprecedented situations in the nuclear world we cannot rely on a pedantic review of precedents." 89 In an effort to maintain the fullest international support for the United States, Macmillan told Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, who questioned the legality of the blockade and rued a lack of meaningful consultation from Washington, that legal criticisms were "sterile and irrelevant." 90 The priority was to "prevent consolidation of the offensive potential for the Soviet Union in Cuba." 91 Promptings such as these may have had some effect. The Canadian Department of External Affairs noted the "sui generis" nature of the quarantine, and the chief of the Naval Staff concluded that, because the lawfulness of the action was ill-defined, Canada could accept it without condoning an illegal act. Nonetheless, as Undersecretary of External Affairs Norman Robertson advised his colleagues, public discussion of the quarantine's legality was best avoided, given the ambiguity of the issue. 92 Australia's Department of External Affairs (DEA) also raised concerns. An analysis for Secretary to the DEA Arthur Tange maintained that pacific blockades were serious but justified measures when enacted under the UN Charter to prevent the outbreak of war. Outside the parameters of the UN, however, many jurists still considered them illegal. William D. Forsyth of the DEA's UN Branch concluded that "no clear positive legal basis appears." 93 Another assessment noted that Canberra had "a distinct interest in preserving the right of powerful allies to put bases and offensive weapons in Australia if we want them."
94 Tange and Minister of External Affairs Garfield Barwick acknowledged the inconsistency of this position given the placement of Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba. Thus, the Australian government "should consider carefully the concept that the presence of such bases and weapons on Cuban soil represents an act of Soviet aggression."
95 If the Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba was an act of aggression, the installation of U.S. weapons on Australian territory might invite a response from the Soviet Union commensurate with the U.S. action: Australia could be "vulnerable to a Soviet blockade (in the name of a 'quarantine') of any American offensive weapons which may be located on Australian soil at some future time and targeted on the Soviet Union." 96 This reasoning implied that the Soviet bases in Cuba and the U.S. base in Turkey were analogous. Ultimately, though, Australia's interest in maintaining U.S. military support prevailed. Laura Stanley and Philip Deery aver that Canberra "pledged its support, albeit limited, to the American UN resolution, in order to obtain a maximum gain: the maintenance of its most important alliance in furtherance of its geostrategic interests." 97 To be sure, some allied representatives-such as President Charles de Gaulle of France and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany-endorsed U.S. policy without displaying any interest in the legal dimension. 98 All the same, the U.S. government's construction of a case in law recognized the fact that the legal propriety of the blockade was very much open to question. Few of the foreign officials or politicians who expressed a view had confidence in the case, although their statements that the existing legal framework was outdated were consistent with the arguments of Washington.
Promoting the Legal Case after the Crisis
After Moscow's agreement to remove Il-28 nuclear-capable bombers as well as the nuclear missiles from Cuba, the Kennedy administration ended the blockade on 20 November. Chayes wanted to neutralize legal criticisms of the blockade, including arguments from the prominent French sociologist Raymond Aron that power politics had prevailed over law, by outlining the legal case in the journal Foreign Affairs. 99 However, he faced opposition from Harlan Cleveland of the State Department's International Organizations Office, who feared unnecessary controversy and was concerned that the legal rationale for relying on regional agencies needed a great deal of refinement if it was ever to work "as good international organization doctrine." 100 Cleveland argued that the UN Charter should not be interpreted as "licensing any use of force by a regional group" and that the doctrine that "regional security actions are valid unless specifically rejected by the UN" gave "too much license to regional arrangements."
101 He also noted the danger of playing into the hands of the Soviet Union, which would seize on any legal justification framed by the U.S. government that could be used for orchestrating Warsaw Pact action against an Iron Curtain state "striving for freedom." 102 Nonetheless, Rusk and Ball backed Chayes, who argued in Foreign Affairs that relying on the OAS as a regional agency did not undermine the status of the UN "as the paramount organization" and that the UN had, "through the Council and the SecretaryGeneral," become "actively involved in the effort to develop a permanent solution to the threat to the peace represented by the Soviet nuclear capability in Cuba." 103 Meeker weighed in, too, with an article in The American Journal of International Law, extending the effort to set a legal precedent by arguing that "no settled law was ready at hand to deal with the action created by the clandestine Soviet introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba in 1962." 104 For Meeker, international law needed to catch up with the quarantine, which was a measured and reasonable response to a real threat.
Conclusion
The U.S. government's promotion of a legal case for blockading Cuba during the missile crisis represented part of a broader effort to win support that included the president's television and radio broadcast of 22 October and briefings to leaders of NATO states and to 95 foreign ambassadors. 105 Although there was little genuine consultation with allies about how to respond to the discovery of the Soviet missiles, allied backing was vital to the moral standing of U.S. policy. 106 Withana argues that the U.S. government's "skillful use of the ideology of international law" was "an important factor" in the outcome of the crisis, and that "relatively weaker references to the ideology of international law by Soviet representatives was a factor in shaping the outcome of in connection with action against Iraq, that "the Administration is avoiding the words 'blockade' and 'quarantine' because under international law those terms can be interpreted as acts of war." 113 The word "interdiction" was used instead. 114 Since then, jurists have been ambivalent about the legal merit of the blockade against Cuba in 1962, with some arguing that it represented a "peaceful blockade" and others maintaining that in the absence of an armed attack it contravened the UN Charter. 115 The "ultimate judgment of history" has not been as favorable as Chayes and his colleagues had hoped. 
